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Abstract
In some localities, a large-scale chain retailer competes against a small-scale local independent
retailer that specializes in, for instance, vegetables, fruits, and owers produced locally for
local consumption.
The former usually attracts consumers by emphasizing its width and depth of products
variety, whereas the latter seeks to overcome its limited products assortment by oering
lower prices for them than the chain store. This is possible for the local store partly because
of lower labor costs and for various other reasons.
This study employs the Hotelling unit interval to examine price competition in a duopoly
featuring one large-scale chain retailer and one local retailer. To express dierences in their
product assortments, we assume that the large-scale retailer denoted by A sells two types
of product, G1 and G2, whereas the local retailer denoted by B sells only G1. Moreover, we
assume that all consumers purchase G1 at A or B after comparing prices and buy G2 at A .
We examine both Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium to indicate that the local retailer can
survive competition with the large-scale chain retailer. We also reveal that a monopolistic
market structure, not duopoly, optimize the social welfare if consumers always purchase both
G1 and G2.
KEYWORDS: Large-scale chain retailer, Small-scale local independent store, Duopoly, Hotelling,
Price competition
JEL Classi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1. Introduction
A large-scale chain retailer store customarily oers a wide and deep product variety to attract
more consumers over a wider area. Product width is a term signifying the dierent types of
products a retailer oers; product depth refers to the variety of a product oered. It is a tenet
in business economics that social welfare gains and revenue gains from product width and depth
must be balanced against the prospect of lower consumer prices and lessened product choice.
Lancaster (1990) has surveyed the issue of product variety from an economist's point of view.
The term product variety is used in his study corresponds broadly to the number of \brands"
as that term appears in the marketing literature.
Kok, Fischer and Vaidyanathan (2006) have extensively reviewed literature on assortment
planning. Kok and Fischer(2007) have proposed a method by which retailers could optimize
product assortment and estimate consumer demand. Cachon and Kok (2007) have examined
the determination of product assortment among multiple merchandise categories and basket
shopping consumers. Toporowski and Lademann (2014) have reviewed a literature that examines
assortment, price, and location in food retailing.
Some chain retailers set prices according to local markets (Dobson and Waterson 2005) to
compete against local independent retailers. Focusing on grocery retailers, Leszczyc, Shinha,
and Timmermans (2000) have estimated a dynamic hazard model to understand factors in-
uencing timing of consumer purchases, store choices, and the competitive dynamics of retail
competition. Swoboda, Berg, Schramm-Klein and Foscht (2013) have discussed the relative im-
portance of retail brand equity and store accessibility for determining store loyalty in dierent
local competitive contexts.
In contrast, local independent stores are usually small-scale, for example, discount supermar-
kets oering everyday-low-pricing and minimal service. They oer fewer product groups and
variants within groups, but they acquire neighborhood consumers who want to reduce their
dependence on automobile (Handy and Cliftono 2001) by oering lower prices than competitors
on targeted groups of products (Kahn and McAlister 1997; Guptil and Wilkins 2002). Lal and
Rao (1997) have investigated the factors underlying the success of every-day-low-pricing. Bell
and Lattin (1998) have linked consumer preference for every-day-low-price retailers versus high
as well as low-price retailers to the expected dollar cost of a household's shopping basket.
In some areas of Japan, local independent retailers sell vegetables, fruits, owers, and sh
produced locally for local consumption. They sell their limited assortments of product groups
at lower prices than that oered by large-scale chain retailer and cater to customers for whom
freshness and prices are essential. They can do so because they buy directly at lower prices
from local growers, farms, and cooperatives and their labor cost are often below those of chain
retailers.
This study uses the Hotelling unit interval model to address price competition in a duopoly
featuring a large-scale chain retailer and a small-scale local independent retailer. We rst dis-
cuss Nash equilibrium and then investigate Stackelberg equilibrium to indicate that the local
independent retailer can survive competition with the chain retailer. We examine social welfare
at Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium and also social optimality.
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2. Model
2.1 Notations and assumptions
Our notations and assumptions are as follows:
(1) Homogeneous consumers are uniformly distributed along the Hotelling unit interval [0; 1]
(Hotelling 1929; Basicaia and Mota 2013).
(2) Large-scale retailer A is located at 0 and a small-scale local independent retailer B is at
1 on the horizontal unit interval [0; 1].
(3) To express the dierences in the product breadth, we assume that A sells two types of
products(G1 and G2), whereas B sells only G1.
(4) Consumers purchase only G1 with probability  and purchase G1 and G2 simultaneously
with probability 1  .
(5) A sells G1 and G2 at prices p
(A)
1 and p2, respectively, and B sells G1 at price p
(B)
1 . Since
we concentrate on price competition between A and B, p2 is assumed to be determined
by some suitable criterion
(6) The raw prices of G1 and G2 are a and b, respectively, where p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1  a and p2  b.
Since we concentrate upon the price competition between A and B, p2 is assumed to be
determined by some suitable criterion.
(7) Consumer willingness to pay for G1 and G2 are u1 and u2, respectively.
(8) Traveling cost for each consumer is c per unit of distance.
(9) u1  max

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

  2c  0 and u2   p2   2c  0.
(10) u1   a  5c.
Note that assumption (9) provides an upper bound for p
(A)
1 and p
(B)
1 given by
pmax1 := u1   2c  max

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

;
and assumption (10) is introduced to avoid mathematical intricacies.
2.2 Indexes
2.2.1 Boundaries
When consumers purchase only G1, the boundary by which consumers are categorized delineates,
~x1 =
1
2
  p
(A)
1   p(B)1
4c
; (1)
where consumers with x 2 [0; ~x1] travel to retailer A , and consumers having x 2 (~x1; 1] visit B.
Note that Eq. (1) considers consumers' round-trip travel costs from their home to the store.
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If consumers purchase G1 and G2, the boundary is given by
~x2 = 1  p
(A)
1   p(B)1
2c
; (2)
where consumers with x 2 [0; ~x2] travel to retailer A to bur both G1 and G2, and consumers
with x 2 (~x2; 1] visit B to obtain G1 and then A to purchase G2.
Equations (1) and (2) engender Proposition 1;
Proposition 1. ~x2 = 2~x1.
Proof. Trivial. 
2.2.2 Expected prots
When consumers behave as observed above, expected prot to A is given by
A

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

= ~x1

p
(A)
1   a

+ (1  )
h
~x2

p
(A)
1   a

+ (p2   b)
i
= [~x1 + (1  )~x2]

p
(A)
1   a

+ (1  )(p2   b); (3)
and B earns his expected prot as
B

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

= [ (1  ~x1) + (1  ) (1  ~x2)]

p
(B)
1   a

: (4)
2.2.3 Best responses
The derivative of A

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

with respect to p
(A)
1 is
@A

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

@p
(A)
1
=
(2  )

a+ 2c  2p(A)1 + p(B)1

4c
;
while that of B

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

in reference to p
(B)
1 is
@B

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

@p
(B)
1
=

2
+
(2  )

a+ p
(A)
1   2p(B)1

4c
:
By solving
@A

p
(A)
1 ;p
(B)
1

@p
(A)
1
= 0 with respect to p
(A)
1 , we obtain the best response of A against
B which is written as
p
(A)
1 =
p
(B)
1 + a
2
+ c: (5)
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The best response of B against A , which is a solution to
@A

p
(A)
1 ;p
(B)
1

@p
(B)
1
= 0 with regard to p
(B)
1 ,
is
p
(B)
1 =
p
(A)
1 + a
2
+
c
2  : (6)
Equations (5) and (6) prompt Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. The best responses of A and B satisfy p
(A)
1  p(B)1 , where the equality holds
when  = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note in Proposition 2 that the price p
(B)
1 oered by B as its best response against A does
not exceed p
(A)
1 . Further, if  = 1, all consumers purchase only G1, where the pricing problem
examined here agrees with the simple pricing problem confronting a single product in a duopoly.
2.2.4 Consumer surplus
Consumer surplus is an essential index for evaluating the equilibrium. Its intricate structure is
given by
CS

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

= 
Z ~x1
0
(u1   p(A)1   2cx)dx+
Z 1
~x1
[u1   p(B)1   2c(1  x)]dx

+(1  )
Z ~x2
0
(u1 + u2   p(A)1   p2   2cx)dx+
Z 1
~x2
(u1 + u2   p(B)1   p2   2c)dx

= [~x1 + (1  )~x2]
h
2c 

p
(A)
1   p(B)1
i
+

u1   p(B)1   2c

+ (1  ) (u2   p2) + c(1  2~x21)  c(1  )~x22: (7)
3. Equilibrium
3.1 Nash equilibrium
Solving Eqs. (5) and (6) with respect to p
(A)
1 and p
(B)
1 simultaneously, we obtain the Nash
equilibrium as follows:
p
(A)
1 = a+
2c
3
+
4c
3(2  ) (< p
max
1 ) ; (8)
p
(B)
1 = a 
2c
3
+
8c
3(2  ) (< p
max
1 ) : (9)
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Hence, the boundaries ~x1 and ~x2 in Eqs. (1) and (2) become
~x1 =
1
6
+
1
3(2  ) ; ~x

2 =
1
3
+
2
3(2  ) :
Prots of A and B at the Nash equilibrium are
A := A

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

= (1  )(p2   b) + c

2
3
  
9

+
4c
9(2  ) ;
B := B

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

=
c(2 + )2
9(2  ) ;
and the consumer surplus is
CS := CS

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

= u1   a+ (1  )(u2   p2)  c

1  17
18
  22
9(2  )

:
The indexes derived above initiate Proposition 3.
Proposition 3.
(i) Both p
(A)
1 and p
(B)
1 are increasing in , whereas their dierence

p
(A)
1   p(B)1

decreases
with increasing .
(ii) Boundary ~x1 increases from
1
3 to
1
2 as  increases, whereas boundary ~x

2 is increasing in
 from 46 to 1.
(iii) A is decreasing in , but 

B is increasing in .
Proof. Trivial. 
In Proposition 3{(ii), when all consumers purchase both G1 and G2 simultaneously, they visit
not B but A because of ~x2 = 1.
3.2 Stackelberg equilibrium
In the real circumstances, the large-scaled chain retailer can be considered a price leader and
the small-scaled local retailer a price follower in a Stackelberg game. Moreover, the relation
p
(A)
1  p(B)1 in Proposition 2 agrees with the underlying idea of a Stackelberg game, suggesting
that the Stackelberg equilibrium is more realistic than the Nash equilibrium. We derive the
Stackelberg equilibrium as follows.
Substituting Eq. (6) into Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) gives
A

p
(A)
1

= (1  )(p2   b) 

p
(A)
1   a
 h
(2  )

p
(A)
1   2c  a

  4c
i
8c
: (10)
By dierentiating A

p
(A)
1

with respect to p
(A)
1 , we have
@A

p
(A)
1

@p
(A)
1
= 1  
4
 

p
(A)
1   a

(2  )
4c
:
6
The solution to
@A

p
(A)
1

@p
(A)
1
= 0 is
p
(A)
1 = a+ c+
2c
2   (< p
max
1 ) ; (11)
which is the optimal price of G1 for A against the best response of B.
When A adopts the selling price in Eq. (11), the optimal price of G1 for B becomes
p
(B)
1 = a 
c
2
+
3c
2   (< p
max
1 ) : (12)
Hence, the boundaries ~x1 and ~x2 in Eqs. (1) and (2) become
~x1 =
1
8
+
1
4(2  ) ; ~x

2 =
1
4
+
1
2(2  ) :
Prots to A and B are
A := A

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

= (1  )(p2   b) + c

3
4
  
8

+
c
2(2  ) ;
B := B

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

=
c(4 + )2
16(2  ) :
Finally, the consumer surplus at the Stackelberg equilibrium is
CS := CS

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

= u1   a+ (1  )(u2   p2)  c

(42  31)
32
  23
8(2  )

:
The indexes in this subsection suggest Proposition 4.
Proposition 4.
(i) Both p
(A)
1 and p
(B)
1 are increasing in , whereas their dierence

p
(A)
1   p(B)1

de-
creases with increasing .
(ii) When  increases from 0 to 1, ~x1 increases from
1
4 to
3
8 , and ~x

2 increases from
1
2 to
3
4 .
(iii) A decreases and 

B increases with increasing .
Proof. Trivial. 
3.3 Comparison
This subsection compares the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium. Table 1 summarizes the indexes
derived above. Comparing the Nash equilibrium with the Stackelberg equilibrium presents
Proposition 5:
Proposition 5.
(i) p
(A)
1 > p
(A)
1 and p
(B)
1 > p
(B)
1 ,
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(ii) ~x1 < ~x1 and ~x2 < ~x2,
(iii) A > 

A > 0,
(iv) B > 

B > 0,
(v) CS < CS.
(vi) (CS   CS) decreases with increasing .
Proof. Trivial. 
Proposition 5 reveals that the local independent retailer B can survive competition against
the large-scaled chain retailer A because it earns a prot both at the Nash and Stackelberg
equilibrium. In addition, A and B earn more at the Stackelberg equilibrium than at the Nash
equilibrium by oering higher prices, thereby reducing consumer surplus. However, the dierence
in consumer surplus (CS  CS) between the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium is decreasing
in .
4. Social Welfare
This section connes itself to social welfare to explore socially optimal prices of the product G1.
Social welfare is given by
W

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

= A

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

+B

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

+ CS

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

= u1   a+ (1  )(u2   b)  (2  )c
2
 
(2  )

p
(A)
1   p(B)1
2
8c
: (13)
The social welfare at the Nash equilibrium is given by
W  := W

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

= (u1   a) + (1  )(u2   b)  c

1  13
18
  2
9(2  )

; (14)
and at the Stackelberg equilibrium, it becomes
W  := W

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

= (u1   a) + (1  )(u2   b)  c

19
16
  35
32
  1
8(2  )

: (15)
Hence, we reach Proposition 6:
Proposition 6. If (0 )  74 
p
1716
47 = 0:69309, then we have
W  W ;
while if 74 
p
1716
47 < ( 1), we have
W  > W :
Proof. Trivial. 
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 
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Proposition 6 signies that the Nash equilibrium provides greater social welfare than the
Stackelberg equilibrium when the probability 1  of purchasing both G1 and G2 tends toward
1.
Now, let us maximize the social welfare with respect to p
(A)
1 and p
(B)
1 . By dierentiating
W

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

with respect to p
(A)
1 and p
(B)
1 , we have
@W

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

@p
(A)
1
=  
(2  )

p
(A)
1   p(B)1

4c
; (16)
@W

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

@p
(B)
1
=
(2  )

p
(A)
1   p(B)1

4c
: (17)
By letting
@W

p
(A)
1 ;p
(B)
1

@p
(A)
1
=
@W

p
(A)
1 ;p
(B)
1

@p
(B)
1
= 0, the optimal prices

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

=

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

maximizing W

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

satises
p
(A)
1 = p
(B)
1 ; (18)
along with
W  :=W

p
(A)
1 ; p
(B)
1

= (u1   a) + (1  )(u2   b)  (2  )c
2
:
Consequently, we have Proposition 7:
Proposition 7. If we have p
(A)
1 = p
(B)
1 to maximize social welfare, consumers buying both G1
and G2 simultaneously visit only A . Particularly when  = 0, social welfare is maximized not
in a duopoly but in a monopoly dominated by A with p
(A)
1 = a.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 7 indicates that when maximizing the social welfare, it becomes more dicult
for B to enter the market as  increases. However, monopoly is generally considered undesir-
able for other economic reasons and consequently the maximization of social welfare would be
meaningless.
Table 2: Comparison of social welfare
Social welfare
Nash equilibrium W  = (u1   a) + (1  )(u2   b)  c
h
1  1318   29(2 )
i
Stackelberg equilibrium W  = (u1   a) + (1  )(u2   b)  c
h
19
16   3532   18(2 )
i
Socially optimum W  = (u1   a) + (1  )(u2   b)  (2 )c2
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5. Conclusion
This study employed the Hotelling unit interval model to examine price competition between
a large-scale chain retailer A and a small-scale local independent retailer B. To represent the
dierence in product assortment between A and B, we assumed that A sells product G1 and
G2 and that B deals in only product G1. We also assumed homogeneous consumers purchase
G1 from A or B and buy G2 at A . Then we focused on price competition over G1. Moreover,
we assumed that each individual consumer purchased G1 only with probability  and purchased
both G1 and G2 with probability 1  .
Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium were examined, and the main results in this study are as
follows:
(1) The local retailer can earn prots both at the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium and
survive competition with a large-scale chain retailer.
(2) Both A and B earn more at the Stackelberg equilibrium than at the Nash equilibrium.
However, consumer surplus diminishes more at the Stackelberg equilibrium than at the
Nash equilibrium.
(3) Maximization of social welfare suggests p
(A)
1 = p
(B)
1 , where consumers buying both G1 and
G2 visit only A . Particularly when  = 0, social welfare is maximized not in a duopoly
but in a monopoly dominated by A . Given the general disrepute in which monopoly is
held, however, the maximization of social welfare would be meaningless.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 3
From Eqs. (5) and (6), we have
p
(A)
1   p(B)1 =
p
(B)
1   p(A)1
2
+ c

1  
2  

;
which agrees with
3
2

p
(A)
1   p(B)1

= c

1  
2  

:
Since 1   2   0, we have p
(A)
1   p(B)1  0. In addition, if  = 1, we have 1   2  = 0, i.e.,
p
(A)
1 = p
(B)
1 . 
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B. Proof of Proposition 7
When p
(A)
1 = p
(B)
1 , Eq. (2) reveals that ~x2 = 1. Accordingly all consumers would visit only
A to purchase both G1 and G2 simultaneously. This signies social welfare is maximized in a
monopoly dominated by A , especially when  = 0. 
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